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Princeton: Princeton University Press. Grossman, G., Helpman, E. (1995). The policy of free trade agreements. American Economic Review, 85 (4), 667-90. Mansfield, E., Pevehouse, J. (2000). Trade blocs, trade flows and international conflicts. International Organization, 54 (4), 775-808. Busch, M. (2007). Institutions, forum-shopping and dispute resolution in international trade.
International Organization, 61 (4), 735-61 Magee, C.S.P. (2008). New measures to create trade and re-focus trade. Journal of the International Economy, 75, 349-362. The additional agreements we found were not notified to the WTO and therefore failed to enter many of the EPZ data based on the WTO PTA inventory. Preferential trade agreements (EPZs) have grown more and more over the past two decades. A great literature has studied different aspects of this phenomenon. Until recently, this literature treated all PTAs in the same way. However, the PTAs are very different in terms of design. In this article, we present a new dataset on the design of trade agreements (DESTA). We illustrate the usefulness of this dataset when reviewing the literature on the business context of EPZs, i.e.
whether and to what extent EDPs influence trade flows. Baier, S., Bergstrand, J., Feng, M. (2011). Agreement on economic integration and the margins of international trade. The discussion paper. J. Roy (2010). Do members of the customs union have more bilateral trade relations than members of the free trade agreement? Review of International Economics, 18(4), 663-81. Preferential trade agreements (EPZs) have grown more and more over the past two decades.
A great literature has studied different aspects of this phenomenon. Until recently, however, many Large N studies have paid little attention to variations between PTAs in terms of content and design. Our contribution to this literature is a new set of data on the design of trade agreements, which is the most comprehensive, both in terms of coding variables and covered agreements. We illustrate the usefulness of the dataset to re-check whether and to what extent EDPs influence trade flows. The analysis shows that the PTA increases trade flows on average, but that this effect is largely fuelled by deep agreements. In addition, we provide evidence that regulatory provisions across the border are important for trade flows. However, the contribution of the data set is not limited to the PTA literature. The new data will also benefit from a wider debate on issues such as the organization of institutions and the legalization of international relations. Baldwin, R., Jaimovich, D. (2012). Are free trade agreements contagious? Journal of International Economics, 88(1), 1-16 Milner, H.
(1997). Industries, governments and the creation of regional trading blocs. In E. Mansfield, H. Milner (Eds.), The Political Economy of Regionalism (p. 77-106). New York: Columbia University Press. Of the 617 agreements for which we have this information, 459 came into force within one year of signing and another 81 within two years of signing. In addition, some agreements are applied on an interim basis immediately after signing. Keyword: preferential trade agreements; The new regionalism; The organisation of institutions; Dataset Trade flows Gravity model F140; F150; F5 (Search for similar items in EconPapers) Date: 2014 References: References in EconPapers View View full reference list